



# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIII, No. 25

APRIL 7, 1944

## POLITICAL TIMETABLE FOR ITALY UPSET BY STALEMATE BELOW ROME

**PRESERVING** a united political front among the Allies is becoming an ever more pressing problem as the Red Army advances in Rumania and Britain and the United States perfect plans for the invasion of Western Europe. If the present alliance is to fare better than earlier coalitions of history, both in expediting the war and preserving the future peace, there must be greater agreement among the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R. on the concrete problems now before them. Among these questions, one of great importance is the political disposition of Italy.

**AGREEMENT ON THE GOAL.** At the Moscow Conference last October decisions were taken that looked toward joint action in Italy on the part of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, all three agreeing that their goal was "based upon the fundamental principle that fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed." To implement this statement of aims, ambitious consultative machinery was set up in the form of an Allied Advisory Council for Italy on which the Big Three were represented. This organization, from its inception, had to compete, however, with other bodies, such as AMG and the Allied Control Commission, which are purely Anglo-American in composition.

But in the five months since Moscow, little progress has been made toward securing a more democratic Italian government. During this period, dissatisfaction has been keen not only in Italy—where on March 12 three Leftist political parties denounced the King and Badoglio at a mass meeting in Naples—but among numerous private persons in the United States and Britain. It was generally assumed, however, that criticism was limited to unofficial circles, while all three major Allies agreed with Prime Minister Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons on February 22 that the time for changes in the

Italian régime would not arrive until Rome was taken. Then, on March 13, Badoglio's announcement that Russia was going to exchange Ambassadors with his government created so much confusion among observers in London and Washington that popular debate on the broad question of what political policy should be pursued in Italy was eclipsed by discussion of what Russian recognition portended. Amid the welter of interpretations, a predominant one was that the Kremlin had decided to recognize Badoglio in order to indicate to the Balkan and other neighboring states that even governments far to the right might be satisfactory to Moscow.

**DISAGREEMENT ON TIMING.** The sensation created by this apparent approval of a government under former fascist leaders by the communist homeland was just dying away when *Izvestia* reopened the whole issue by declaring on March 30 that the U.S.S.R.'s step was intended to register Soviet dissatisfaction with the operations of the Allied Advisory Council for Italy. According to the official organ of the Supreme Soviet, in offering the first Russian explanation of the Kremlin's new Italian policy, the British and American members of the Council had merely "informed" the Russian delegate instead of "consulting" with him about political decisions affecting Italy, and pursued a policy that did not meet with Moscow's approval. Calling for immediate action to make the Badoglio régime more democratic by the inclusion of representatives of Italian forces "prepared to fight against Hitler and Mussolini," the Russian editorial disputed British Foreign Secretary Eden's statement to the House of Commons on March 22 that the Soviet government had not expressed dissatisfaction with the Council's decision to retain the present Italian government until Rome had been captured. According to *Izvestia*, therefore, Russia decided to send representatives to Badoglio because the Kremlin wished to establish its

own sources of information in Italy, comparable to those the United States and Britain have through consuls in South Italy, as a step toward effecting changes in the Marshal's cabinet. Far from carrying any approval of the present Italian government—as would American recognition, if it were to come—Russia's establishment of "factual relations" was intended to aid the U.S.S.R. in modifying the very régime it recognized.

**ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY NEEDS REVISION.** With the three major Allies united on their political goal in Italy but in disagreement on the timing of actions required for attaining that aim, there is need for Britain and the United States to reconsider their policy of awaiting the fall of Rome before changing the Badoglio government and removing King Victor Emmanuel. In the realm of local administration, as a matter of fact, AMG is now carrying out political changes on a large scale. In Naples Province alone—according to an announcement of March 28—690 Italians suspected of fascist views have been suspended from their posts. But action comparable to these purges in provincial circles is still needed in connection with the national government.

A decision to implement the inter-Allied promise of last October—to rid Italy of fascists—by making changes at the top of the present régime could be expected to give a boost to Italian morale both in southern Italy, where observers report that the honeymoon phase of the occupation is waning, and in the area north of the Gustav line, where pro-Allied guer-

rillas have rallied under anti-fascist leaders. Henry F. Grady, ranking American member of the Allied Control Commission in Italy which is working closely with AMG, confirmed this view on March 31 by asserting that there was "complete unanimity" among the people of occupied Italy on the need of ousting the present King. Moreover, the decision to await the fall of the Italian capital before making changes in the Italian government needs to be reviewed in the light of the military stalemate on the road to Rome. This delay has upset the Allied timetable on which present policy is based. Above all, agreement among the Big Three on the timing of major political changes must be achieved before new life can be breathed into the Allied Council for Italy. One obstacle in transforming the present Badoglio government, it must be confessed, has been the refusal of the Italian liberal and democratic parties to cooperate with the Marshal on even a purely temporary basis. But this difficulty might be overcome if there were Allied agreement that political changes must be made now and that the only practical way to secure them is by altering the Badoglio régime through a series of shifts in the cabinet. The decision of Britain and the United States to work with Russia in modifying the Italian government in the immediate future, therefore, would not only take into account present political and military realities in Italy but would strengthen the unity of the Big Three and bring them into greater harmony for both the war and post-war periods.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

## UNITED NATIONS EXPLORE NEW REGIME FOR AIR TRANSPORT

Preliminary discussions to explore the possibility of a world air agreement were initiated during the last week of March with bilateral talks between American and Canadian officials in Montreal. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle and Edward P. Warner, Vice Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, who represented the United States in Canada, are now in London for conversations with spokesmen for the British government. It is expected that a Russian delegation will arrive in Washington within ten days to meet an American group led by Joseph C. Grew, special assistant to the Secretary of State, and L. Welch Pogue, chairman of the CAB. Conversations with China and Brazil are also anticipated before an international gathering is held this summer as the last step prior to a full-dress United Nations air conference.

**A NEW AIR LAW.** In these bilateral conversations, as in the prospective international meetings, the central problem will be to reach agreement on the air régime which is to govern post-war operations of international air transport. During the pre-war period international air services were subject to the principle

of the "closed sky." Special permission was required not only to land on foreign soil for purposes of discharging and taking on passengers and cargo, as well as for refuelling or repairs, but also for entering or passing through a nation's air space. As a result, commercial airlines were able to operate over most of the world—with the exception of Latin America where foreign air companies received many concessions directly from the governments—only after hard bargaining between nations on the basis of reciprocal rights. But it is now widely believed, both in this country and abroad, that the old air law will not be suitable to rapid expansion of air transport after the war because of the delays and friction it would entail. A search is therefore being made for a system under which the legitimate aspirations of each of the United Nations can be more easily reconciled.

Although United States policy has not been officially enunciated the American position, as defined in the speeches of Chairman Pogue of the CAB, differs considerably from that already taken by Canada and from what is now known of the British position. The essence of Pogue's proposals is his insistence on

the principle of freedom of commercial air transit, whereby all nations adhering to an international convention would have the right of transit over foreign territory and the use of all necessary technical services, including the right to land for fuel or repairs. Commercial outlets, the right to pick up passengers or freight, would be left to bilateral negotiation. Assuming world-wide agreement on air transit, a New York-to-Moscow airline, for example, could be opened on the mere negotiation of a commercial outlet agreement. The complicated negotiations with intervening countries which were the rule under the closed-sky would be unnecessary. Such a system would need supervision by an international air body, but apparently under Pogue's proposal the authority of such a body would be limited to matters like control of competitive practices and rates, uniform standards and coordination of navigation aids. It is held by its supporters that free transit would be of great advantage to countries which plan extensive international air operations—particularly the United States, which is in a relatively weak geographical position for air bargaining.

The British government has indicated its approval of the principle of freedom of air transit, but is thought to be anxious to go much farther than the United States in granting jurisdiction to an international air authority. This body, according to a view widely held in Britain, should have power to determine the allocation of routes and the frequency of services, in order to prevent unrestricted competition at the close of the war. In addition, it has been proposed that an international agency take over the airlines now operated by the enemy and those passing through areas of vital security interest.

Canadian policy, set forth in a draft convention presented to the House of Commons on March 17, calls for a multilateral agreement combining freedom of transit and the granting of commercial outlets. It proposes that the opening of air services be conditional on permission of an international air au-

thority, for Canada does not wish to relinquish its geographical position under the closed-sky without assurance that in the new régime it will gain a fair share of transoceanic air services. But, with the special circumstances of American-Canadian relations in mind, Canada proposes that services between contiguous countries should not come under the jurisdiction of an international air transport board.

"CHOSEN INSTRUMENT" DEBATE. Whether or not these differences are reconciled in the current discussions, it is unlikely that the Administration will commit itself until the Senate Commerce Committee has held open hearings on our post-war aviation policy, and a decision is reached concerning the question of competition among American airlines themselves. Pan-American Airways, long the outstanding United States foreign carrier, favors the policy of a single "chosen instrument" to operate all American international services, and to date has also backed the closed-sky system under which it became firmly established in many parts of the world. It is supported in this attitude by United Airlines, one of the largest domestic companies. But in opposition are the sixteen remaining domestic airlines—many of them now flying internationally under the Army Air Transport Command—including American Airlines which has just purchased American Export, Pan-American's only American rival in commercial Atlantic services. Until the United States resolves its national air policy—and it may possibly be resolved by the establishment of several chosen instruments—this country can hardly reach final agreements with the other United Nations.

HOWARD P. WHIDDEN, JR.

*Journey into War*, by John MacVane. New York, Appleton-Century, 1943. \$3.00

Exciting account of the American campaign in North Africa. Bitterly critical of the State Department's handling of the political angle.

*Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press*, as of January 1, 1944. Edited by Walter H. Malloy. New York, Harpers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1944. \$2.75

An invaluable annual review of information necessary to understand the changing political picture throughout the world.

*War and Postwar Policies*, by Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock. Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1944. \$2.00 cloth, \$1.00 paper.

The text and related documents of the official report to James F. Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization, in a form convenient for reference use.

Just published—

## ECONOMICS AND PEACE

by Herbert Feis

25c

April 1 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

REPORTS are published on the 1st and 15th of each month.

Subscription \$5; to F.P.A. members, \$3.


FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIII, No. 25, APRIL 7, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, President; DOROTHY F. LEE, Secretary; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year  
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG  
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



# Washington News Letter



APRIL 3.—Should the United States recognize the French Committee of National Liberation? Although there are many important questions in American foreign policy, the French matter illustrates better than any other single issue the difficulties confronting the Washington Administration in the management of international relations. Would recognition violate the legitimist principle that nations shall be free to choose their own governments? The Committee's capital is outside metropolitan France and its leader, General Charles de Gaulle, was chosen by a relatively small group. Although the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union do not recognize the French Committee as a "government," de Gaulle declared on March 18 that the French Committee of National Liberation is "in charge" of French sovereignty and, as such, responsible for safeguarding public order and the lives of the French people when the Allied invasion occurs.

**MILITARY NEEDS CONTROL POLICY.** Administration officials expect that de Gaulle will probably occupy a high, perhaps the highest, position in France at the French people's will when their country is freed. Yet a year ago authorities here feared him as an extreme chauvinist and possible dictator. But his speeches and his conduct in recent months in the practical administration of affairs, and in tempering his own wishes to the desires of the Provisional Consultative Assembly, have indicated to Washington that he takes democratic responsibilities seriously.

Nevertheless, the Administration reports that it will recognize a French government only when one is duly and popularly constituted on French European territory. It is inflexibly determined not to extend the limited recognition which, in company with Britain, it granted to the Committee last August 26 at the Quebec Conference. The Quebec formula recognized the Committee as the trustee of French territory overseas, and the Moscow Conference subsequently gave the organization a voice in continental affairs to the extent of allowing it representation on the Italian Armistice Control Commission and the Advisory Council for Italy.

The dominant consideration guiding the Administration in its French policy is military. President Roosevelt, the War Department and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied commander in the European theatre, have evolved the policy, with the State Department playing simply an advisory part. Mr. Roosevelt emphasized this situation on March 18, when he

told his press conference that he had decided on the role the Committee would play when France is invaded. The President sent his decision to General Eisenhower, who at the time of invasion is to explain to General de Gaulle the limits of his authority in France until the country is in a position to make a political decision of its own.

The day-to-day decisions respecting almost every foreign question is at present controlled by the military, which above all wants governmental stability in areas close to Allied operations. That outlook explains in large measure the American policy toward Spain and King Victor Emmanuel, and temporary American noninterference with the British White Paper policy in Palestine. When the State Department and the military disagree, the military view usually prevails.

**FACTIONS IN FRANCE.** General Eisenhower is said to fear that recognition of the French Committee now might contribute to instability in France and inspire noncooperation with the invasion on the part of those Frenchmen in France who oppose de Gaulle but support the Allies. The basis for this view appears to be the belief that France today is divided into factions. On the one hand, there is the resistance movement that unites communists, Catholics—including priests—and many other shades of political opinion. Although it is difficult to determine whether the resistance movement is solidly united behind de Gaulle, as the French Committee alleges, its members clearly oppose Allied intervention in what they consider purely French affairs. The clandestine newspaper, *La Democrate*, on March 14 quoted a resistance leader: "We will appoint our prefects and our ministers ourselves; we will hold elections ourselves."

The conservative and collaborationist segments of France, on the other hand, are openly divided. On the extreme fascist side is the clique of Marcel Déat, new Minister of Labor and National Solidarity in the Vichy government. He scorns the milder collaborationists who have been controlling Vichy, whose "revolution" he considers false and reactionary. New inspiration for these elements to hold fast to their cause came in the trial and execution in Algiers of Pierre Pucheu, for what happened to him might befall them if they abandon collaboration with Germany.

BLAIR BOLLES

(This is the second in a series of four articles on American foreign policy.)

**FOR VICTORY • BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS**